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Scapegoating in Post ‘Celtic Tiger’ Ireland:
Framing Blame in Crisis Times 
Lee F. Monaghan, Micheal O’Flynn and Martin J. Power
Abstract
Irish society continues to reel in the aftershock of the 2008 global financial crisis,
particularly since the government socialised the massive liabilities of private banks.
Sensitized to antagonistic social relations using group conflict theory, frame analysis
and Marxian informed critique, this paper reflects on some of the corrosive social
consequences of the crisis. In particular, we interrogate hegemonic discourses which
scapegoat various targets, such as public sector workers and social welfare recipients.
While scapegoating is understood anthropologically as the ‘transference of evil’ our
sociological interest is in the transference of blame and privately accumulated debt
as part of a class project that has served finance capital and its representatives so
well. In conclusion, we suggest that Ireland serves as an example of the power and
dominance of the financial sector under late capitalism, and of the ideological means
by which its socially corrosive ends are currently facilitated.
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Introduction: From ‘Banker Bashing’ to Predatory Finance Capital
The policy decisions following the collapse of  the so-called ‘Celtic  Tiger’  in 2008
demonstrate the extent to which wealthy and influential groups have been able to
offload the costs of the global financial crisis (GFC) onto others. Ireland’s crisis also
offers  a  valuable  case  study  on  the  processes  of  ideological  rationalisation  that
accompany predatory finance capital, making clear that as economic crises unfold,
oppressed groups are all too often treated as convenient scapegoats for the ills of a
globalised system that is  devouring itself  (Ticktin 2009).  The unemployed,  public
sector  workers  and  immigrants  are  usual  targets  in  Ireland,  as  elsewhere,  as
competition  intensifies  over  resource  allocation.  Similarly,  later  entrants  into  the
property bubble, who now find they can no longer keep up mortgage repayments
(especially  after  wages  were  slashed  and  unemployment  rapidly  increased)  find
themselves  being  held  culpable  for  their  ‘irresponsible’  (sic)  borrowing.  This  is
despite well  documented control  frauds within the financial  sector,  including the
deliberate issuance of bad loans, which resulted in rampant asset price inflation in
the USA and beyond (Black 2005).
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At the same time, we would avoid reproducing those ‘fantasmatic logics’ (Glynos et
al. 2012) that socially construct a select few elites as diversionary scapegoats, that is,
the  appeal  of  simply  blaming  narrowly  logical  targets  such  as  executives  of
bailed-out banks. Indeed, we recognise the limitations of ‘banker bashing’ not least
because it is individualising and sociological attention must be directed at broader
structured relations, logics and discourses. Indeed, we would flag the de-politicising
character of ‘banker bashing’ and how those facilitating the bail-out of the financial
sector are among the most eager to participate in the practice. German Chancellor
Angela Merkel, for example, recently expressed ‘outrage’ on hearing the Anglo tapes
(a series of taped conversations between senior executives at Anglo Irish Bank, made
public in June 2013) (Sherrard 2013). The tapes suggest that bankers planned to load
the  Irish  state  with  billions  of  Euros  worth  of  private  debt,  requiring  necessary
deceptions of politicians and central bank officials. The fact that ‘banker bashing’ is
an  individualising  and  de-politicising  reaction  to  the  crisis  permitted  Merkel  to
express moral indignation and apparent outrage at the callous attitude toward the
European taxpayer, while at the same time presiding over the bailout of European banks at
public expense. Likewise, a leading Irish politician, Tánaiste (Deputy Prime Minister)
Eamon Gilmore, said the tapes were ‘disgusting’, that they showed the ‘arrogance’,
‘contempt’ and ‘sheer greed’ of senior executives at Anglo Irish Bank (thejournal.ie,
2013). However, apart from the flippant and offensive tone of the tapes, Gilmore did
not condemn the bankers’ economic interests (the socialisation of massive private
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debts) as ‘disgusting’. In fact Gilmore expressed relief that the Anglo tapes had not
emerged earlier, since they might have jeopardised the Irish government’s debt-deal
negotiations with European authorities - the same negotiations that have burdened
current and future generations with paying off Anglo’s debt to European banks and
private bondholders (WNS Reporter 2013). 
The opportunism that characterises ‘banker bashing’ is only one strand of a much
more elaborate and corrosive system, explored further in our paper. At a time when
a  transnational  ‘feral  overclass’  (a  hard  core  of  financiers,  executives  and  their
representatives)  (Scambler  and  Scambler  2012:  2.5)  are  running  amok,  we  are
concerned with how waves of opprobrium are being heaped onto the denizens of
odiously indebted nations who have largely been constructed as blameworthy.  In
particular,  people  who would have formerly  been  considered ‘working class’  are
being socially constructed as parasitic on a system that can ill-afford them and which
is groaning under the weight of their ‘unreasonable demands’ (e.g. the desire for
decent  employment  opportunities,  healthcare,  education,  pension  provision  and
social security). In this paper, we go some way towards critiquing all-too-common
efforts  to  construct  easy  scapegoats  in  these  crisis  times.  Our  discussion  will  be
elaborated with reference to post ‘Celtic Tiger’ Ireland, where the toxic fallout from
the GFC is severely impacting civil society (Allen 2009; McDonough and Loughrey
2009).  However,  as  we  will  explain,  our  paper  is  also  intended  to  have  wider
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resonance when interrogating an interconnected ‘world system’ (Wallerstein 1983) of
exploitative  class  relations  and ideological  fictions  where  it  is  not  only  Ireland’s
(new) poor and marginalised who risk vilification. 
Scapegoating: The Secular ‘Transference of Evil’ in Late Capitalist Societies 
The word scapegoating is derived from religious practice aimed at taking away the
sins of the world (Frazer 1919). In biblical stories it involved the ritual transfer of evil
to a live goat, from which the process gets its name (Girard 1989). Anthropologists
have observed this ‘transference of evil’ across a range of cultures, involving animals,
inanimate objects and, all too often people (or groups of people). In certain regions,
such  as  in  parts  of  sub-Saharan  Africa  where  witchcraft  is  still  practiced,  those
labelled as witches are killed with the view to warding off misfortune (Miguel 2005).
Significantly,  the  number  of  such  killings  tends  to  increase  when  a  calamitous
situation (i.e. a drought or disease) suddenly and drastically impacts on the fortunes
of  a  community.  Detailed  analysis  of  the  problem  as  it  affects  rural  Tanzania
concludes  that  severe  income  shocks  are  the  key  cause  of  sudden  increases  in
murders of elderly women accused of witchcraft.  Typically, when extreme rainfall
negatively impacts income there is a doubling of witch murders (Miguel 2005).
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Here, we are concerned with the forms of scapegoating that emerge independently
of  religious  practices  and  rituals,  but  that  likewise  appear  to  flourish  under
conditions of economic hardship and exacerbated insecurities. With the GFC as our
backdrop, we are most concerned with the processes that facilitate the channelling of
blame  away  from  one  social  group  (usually  the  most  powerful  and  influential)
towards  subordinated  and  marginalised  groups.  Periodic  instances  of  ‘banker
bashing’ aside (and occasional punishment of ‘deviant cases’ such as Bernard Madoff
in the USA who constructed a $65bn ponzi scheme and who could in fact be viewed
as the tip of an iceberg; see self reference 2012), it is those groups lower down the
social hierarchy who are most vulnerable to the fallout from the GFC as powerful
groups  seek  to  defend  the  status  quo.  Accordingly,  we  are  concerned  with
scapegoating as it relates to and facilitates the on-going redistribution of wealth as
the public gaze is  focused on certain groups of  people who are vilified for their
alleged offences  against  the  moral  and symbolic  order  of  society.  Hence,  we are
primarily interested in scapegoating in its secular sense and in the context of the
crises  of  late  capitalism,  with  close  attention  to  its  development  in  the  wake  of
Ireland’s economic collapse. 
Of  course,  as  indicated  above,  the  process  of  scapegoating  and  the  conditions
underlying this process are not specific to any particular nation state. Furthermore,
attention cannot be limited to economically underdeveloped nations where people’s
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immediate livelihoods are especially vulnerable to the vagaries of the weather and
infectious  diseases.  For  example,  research  in  the  USA and Europe has  identified
self-interest  and  resource  competition  as  key  reasons  for  hostility  towards  other
groups in society (Bobo  1988, Espenshade and Hempstead  1996). ‘Members of the
ingroup…  enjoy(ed)  privileged  access  to  resources  such  as  jobs,  power,  money,
welfare benefits’ etc., which if ‘challenged by competition’ for these resources from
’outgroups’ sees prejudice enacted, as a mechanism to keep a grip on the status quo
(Gibson 2002:  72, cited in McLaren and Johnson 2004:  713). Accordingly, the group
conflict theoretical framework (Blumer 1958) argues that how members of outgroups
(i.e. those excluded from the dominant means of symbolic reproduction and public
opinion formation) are portrayed/perceived is dependent on whether they pose a
substantial threat to the ingroup’s advantageous circumstances or their requirements
for resources (McLaren and Johnson 2004). In brief, group conflict theory, ‘although
originally  envisioned as a theory of  prejudice and discrimination,  also informs a
wealth of research on formal social control’ (King and Wheelcock 2007: 1255). We
would suggest that the theory also provides a useful framework for understanding
the  scapegoating  of  subordinated  populations  in  Ireland,  and  the  relative
subordination of the nation itself in what Wallerstein (1983) would refer to as a world
system. 
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As part of a theoretically eclectic approach, we also see value in at least two other
lines of analysis. First, framing analysis sensitises us to how claims makers seek to
make their definition of reality prevail over competing versions. Our concern in the
ensuing critique is to show how the dominant ‘ingroup’ construct and marginalise
the ‘outgroup’, even when the latter are the statistical majority. In other words, we
will  utilise  framing  analysis  in  order  to  see  group  conflict  theory  and  the
politicised/diversionary process of stigmatising myriad targets in operation. We will
use such an approach to illuminate the powerful role of the ‘framers’ (members of
the  privileged  ingroup)  and  the  part  they  play  in  moulding  social  discourses,
orchestrating the public agenda and controlling the public thought process (Breen
2007,  cited  in  Marron  2011:  24). Second,  as  seen  with  reference  to  some  of  the
literature  broached in  the  next  section  that  places  framing and competition over
resources in context, we are indebted to Marxian informed critiques.
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Scapegoating in Context: (Post) ‘Celtic Tiger’ Ireland and the GFC
Scapegoating  in  contemporary  Ireland  cannot  be  divorced  from  dire  political
economic conditions wherein conflict over resource allocation has been escalating. In
2008 the Irish government put up ‘the entire Irish State as collateral for the crushing
liabilities  of  six  private  banks  ...  approximately  €400  billion  in  leveraged  loans’
(McCabe  2011:  169).  Viewing  Ireland’s  crisis  through  a  Marxian  lens,  which  is
attentive  to  forms  of  swindling,  expropriation  and  ideological  fictions  in
class-divided  societies,  Allen  (2009)  offers  a  damning  critique  of  the  nation’s
economic  crash.  According  to  Allen,  dominant  class  interests  turned  what  was
widely considered an ‘economic miracle’ into a nightmare for vast swathes of the
population,  ranging  from  manual  workers  and  the  unemployed  to  middle-class
professionals  in  the  public  sector  who  have  had  their  incomes  slashed  while
struggling to repay mortgages on their homes - the prices of which were inflated
exponentially during a housing bubble (see Hennigan 2008). This fits similar lines of
analysis of Anglo-American capitalism, such as that offered by Harman (2009) and
Hudson (2010) where the fictions of finance capital have proven so catastrophic.
Critiquing the extractive operations of global finance capital, and a complicit political
class that enabled Ireland to become the ‘Wild West of European finance’ (McCabe
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2011:  148)  self  reference  (2012,  2013)  interrogate  the  conditions  underlying  the
intensification  of  scapegoating.  In  so  doing,  they  suggest  that  scapegoating  -  in
combination  with  other  processes,  such  as  mass  deception,  efforts  to  maintain
secrecy/silence  and  obfuscation  -  occlude  critical  attention  that  might  otherwise
challenge deeper  structural  relations,  figurations  and logics  that  have served the
hegemonic interests of financiers, property developers, rentiers and members of a
corrupt political class (see also Mahon 2012). We anticipate most readers will have at
least some familiarity with the tale of the so-called ‘Celtic Tiger’ economy (1995 to
2008). To quote a well known Irish journalist, the rise and fall of Ireland’s economy
makes ‘Icarus look surprisingly boring’ (O’Toole 2010: 10). It is widely understood
that  the Irish economy experienced an unprecedented boom, serving as a poster
child for Europe, before it suddenly went bust as the US financial crisis went global.
The Celtic Tiger era should thus be understood as a speculative boom (self reference
2013)  -  a  brief  period  in  history  when  Ireland,  which  has  always  had  a  weak
indigenous economy and is effectively an ‘outpost of the USA’ (Allen 2009: 152), rode
on the coat-tails of far more powerful global players. 
We  would  add  that  Ireland’s  ‘new  found  prosperity’  was  never  widely  shared;
indeed, it was realised in the context of increasing inequality in what is one of the
most unequal  members of  the European Union (EU) (McDonough and Loughrey
2009). The illusory (Share and Corcoran 2010) status of Ireland’s economic miracle
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was effectively exposed as finance capitalism hit a brick wall in 2008, culminating in
massive bank bailouts and attendant austerity. This has involved sums which dwarf
the levels witnessed in other EU nations as citizens are held liable for private losses
within the finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) sector. Self reference (2013: 10), in
their Madoffization of Irish society thesis and their discussion on the significance of
debt-expansion, cite various sources when explaining how Ireland has the dubious
honour of being the most burdened in the EU by bank debts. Noting Eurostat data
for 2007 to 2011, it is reported that: ‘When the European banking crisis is costed on
an individual basis throughout the EU, it works out at €192 per person. The cost
bourn by German citizens is considerably more, standing at €491. However, the cost
per  capita  in  Ireland  stands  at  €8,981  (Taft  2013)’.  Accumulation  though  debt
expansion,  as  discussed by  self  reference  (2012,  2013),  is  a  crucial  mechanism of
wealth transference in nations dominated by ponzi finance and associated fictions.
The bail-out of Irish banks fits a pre-established pattern, revealing a power structure
that renders the process of scapegoating intelligible. As we have emphasised above,
scapegoating involves redirecting blame from powerful,  privileged and influential
groups to others (invariably to people of more modest means and influence). That
considered,  it  is  important  to  remember  that  the  financial  sector’s  interest  were
prioritised by government policy long before the 2008 blanket guarantee (McCabe
2010). When the GFC hit, true to form, Ireland’s politicians bowed to bankers and
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speculators and socialised astronomical private losses in their entirety much to the
dissatisfaction of EU partners. A sovereign debt crisis predictably ensued before the
intervention of international money lenders. 
Ireland’s suicidal bank bailouts culminated in Ireland taking an €85bn conditional
loan in 2010 from the EU and European Central Bank, funded, in no small part, by
the  country’s  own  pension  reserves  (€17.5bn).iAlong  with  the  International
Monetary fund (IMF), the so-called Troika have become the ‘heroic saviours’ of a
nation in crisis (or, rather, we argue, the defenders of the private interests of bankers,
developers  and international  bondholders),  and continue to  provide  a  seemingly
incontestable  rationale  for  right-wing  economic  policies  at  the  time  of  writing.
Competing frames and dissenting voices notwithstanding, we are told ad nauseum
by politicians  and mainstream media  that  the  attendant  programme of  austerity,
although difficult and protracted, is necessary in order to satisfy ‘the markets’ and
‘balance the budget’ – obfuscating claims that cloud the real exploitation and looting
that  are  still  underway.  As  witnesses  to  and subjects  of  this  regime,  we  are  not
‘cooled out’ to use Goffman’s (1952) terminology in his analysis of the confidence
game where efforts are made to appease the ‘marks’ (targets of the swindle) after the
‘accident’ or ‘mistake’ that leaves them financially worse off (also, see Glynos et al.
2012). Indeed, to add insult to injury, on-going dispossession and its legitimation are
proceeding under the ‘leadership’ of a subsequently elected coalition government
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that supposedly represents the public interest  but is evidently more interested in
giving  ‘instruction  in  the  philosophy of  taking  a  loss’  (Goffman 1952:  452).  This
coalition, comprising Fine Gael and Labour, was elected in 2011 and has shamelessly
reneged on election promises  such as  ‘burning bank bond holders’.  In short,  the
current  Irish  government  is  administering  the  deeply  divisive  neoliberal  (class)
project  of  accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2005),  where  ‘savings’  (cuts  to
social welfare, incomes and basic public services) are accompanied by increases in
levies  and  taxation  that  were  previously  deemed  ‘obscene’  by  these  very  same
politicians  when  in  opposition.  For  example,  the  current  Fine  Gael  Minister  for
Finance, Michael Noonan, when in opposition in 2010, stated:
What legal or moral compulsion is on Ireland, however, to honour in full
debt incurred by Irish banks when there was no state involvement in these
arrangements? These loans were entered into freely by willing lenders and
borrowers,  with  absolutely  no  state  participation.  The  interest  rate
charged represented  the  risk  at  the  time,  and there  never  was  a  state
liability. It is obscene that liability for these loans is now being transferred
to the Irish taxpayer, in many respects to the poorest of the Irish taxpayers.
The Irish government  and the taxpayer has  no liability  whatsoever for
these  debts  … In  the  Budget,  the  minister  for  Finance  reduced  social
welfare payments, punished the blind, disabled, widows, carers and the
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unemployed and he taxed the poorest at work, and for what? It was so the
taxpayer can take on liability for debts the country never incurred, and
arose  from  private  arrangements  between  private  institutions.  What  a
disaster and an obscenity (cited in Kerrigan 2012).  
In  his  current  role,  Minister  Noonan  presides  over  arrangements  designed  to
institutionalise this obscenity. To use Dinerstein’s (2004: 264-8) words regarding the
political economic conditions under which the Argentineans took to the streets in
December  2001,  we are  witnessing  in  Ireland ‘economic terrorism’  and ‘violence
intrinsic to the imposition of the capitalist (dis)order’. Yet, forms of protest in Ireland
remain  somewhat  muted  as  privileged  groups  seek  to  reproduce  the  status  quo
through various channels of communication, notably the mainstream media.
Mindful  of  the larger  context  of  neoliberal  globalisation and financialisation,  our
substantive  interest  in  and  concerns  about  scapegoating  in  contemporary  Irish
society are thus located within these broader processes and conflicts. Indeed, as with
other  late  capitalist  nations,  the  population  of  Ireland  are  witnessing  the
intensification of oppressive political economic conditions that are hitting the most
vulnerable members  of  society  hardest  and  are  likely  to  continue as  long as  the
odiously  imposed  debt  remains.  Unfortunately,  economic  indicators  suggest  that
conditions over resource allocation and competition are likely to get much worse
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(Taft 2013), and, by implication, the scapegoating will likely intensify. We now turn
to the scapegoating of various groups - the oppressive ‘framing’ of myriad targets -
in contemporary Irish mainstream media and hegemonic political discourse.
Oppression, Values and Ideologies: Shaping Perception, Framing Blame
In Ireland, the political decision to socialise private banking debt and subsequent austerity
policies are rooted in hegemonic class interests and neoliberal ideology, which seek to ‘frame
and shape  individuals’  perceptions  and preferences  so  as  to  pre-empt  challenges  to  the
status quo’ (Glasberg and Shannon 2011: 48). In that regard, the ‘conflict frame’ emerges in
discourse to divert attention away from the choices made within the political economy and
towards some other aspect of social life, while the ‘responsibility frame’ is used to ‘reveal’
those who are ‘really’ responsible for our social ills (d’Heaenens and de Lange 2001). Given
the scale of social suffering currently being imposed on various sections of Irish society it is
no surprise to  see stark examples of  both frames in circulation.  For example,  immigrant
rights,  trade unions and social  justice have increasingly come under fire since 2008,  and
many civil society organizations have had to participate in debates ’where the terms of the
discussion guarantee that they cannot progress their goals i.e.  debates about budget cuts
rather than focusing on [creating] jobs’ (O’Donoghue 2012). 
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By way of illustrating the use of such frames in Ireland, we now focus on a number
of dominant discourses that circulate in the public domain: ‘we were all to blame’,
the ‘inefficient’  public service,  and welfare ‘fraud’.  These discourses figure in the
scapegoating  of  (1)  the  whole  population  of  Ireland  (an  obfuscating  ‘we’  that
supposedly  democratises  blame),  alongside  more  specific  ‘drains’  on  the  system,
such as (2) unionised public sector workers whose interests are allegedly antagonistic
to the valorised private sector and (3) recipients of social welfare, ranging from single
mothers  who ostensibly  have children  with multiple  fathers,  to  immigrants  who
reportedly  fly  into  the  country  to  claim  benefits  before  departing.  As  a  caveat,
informed critique also appears within mainstream newspapers (e.g. Browne 2012)
and we draw from such commentary, though the aforementioned discourses remain
hegemonic in the contested process of framing and scapegoating.    
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Democratising Blame: ‘We All Partied’
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As finance capital imploded, blame was largely deflected away from the government
and the most powerful groups that dominate government policy. As in other parts of
the world, the most privileged groups exercised their power in an effort to castigate
subordinated groups. Likewise, only the most powerful and influential groups have
the means to deflect opprobrium (McCullagh 2010), with the convenient exception of
a few aberrant types or ‘rotten apples’ (as exposed by whistleblowers rather than the
authorities  as  seen  with  our  earlier  reference  to  the  Anglo  Irish  Bank  debacle).
Though at the early stages of the economic meltdown it was difficult for the political
class to deflect blame from the financial and property sectors - there was a steady
stream of revelations that could not be ignored - the process of scapegoating others
began immediately in the interests of reproducing dominant class interests. Indeed,
the political establishment began by attempting to spread the blame as thinly and
widely  among  the  population  as  possible.  According  to  the  then  Minister  for
Finance, Brian Lenihan ‘we decided as a people, collectively, to have this property
boom’, or to put it another way, ‘we all partied’ (cited in Kerrigan 2012). As far as
government  ministers  were  concerned,  there  was  no  point  blaming  financiers,
speculators  and  their  political  representatives.  We  were  all  culpable  and  should
share  in  the  shame  of  this  self-inflicted  catastrophe.  Similarly,  Minister  Martin
Mansergh acknowledged that mistakes had been made, but was only prepared to
admit ‘imprudence, with the benefit of hindsight, on the part of us all’ (ibid.).
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The doctrine that we were all to blame found various forms of expression, but one of
the most convenient was the myth of a lust for property that was specific to the Irish.
This notion of an Irish ‘property-owning gene’ rested on claims that the rate of home
ownership  is  higher  in  Ireland  than  in  other  European  countries  –  a  view
contradicted by any long-term comparison with European averages. In 2006, at the
peak of the boom, home ownership in Ireland stood at 76 per cent, putting Ireland at
16th in home-ownership levels,  out  of  the 27 nations listed by Eurostat  (cited in
McCabe 2010). However, divergences at particular points in time (such as in 1991,
when levels of home ownership were unusually high before increases in the cost of
housing  far  outstripped  minimal  growth  in  the  average  industrial  wage)  were
considered enough to substantiate  claims that  the Irish were less  content  to  rent
property than people on the continent,  that  the Irish were simply obsessed with
owning  their  own  homes.  This  explanation  was  sometimes  expressed  in
pop-psychology  terms.  McWilliams  (2007:  109-10)  for  instance,  suggests  that
‘[n]o-one who has seen Irish people queuing up to buy second and third homes can
suggest that what they have seen is rational’. As far as McWilliams was concerned
the Irish, including those desperately trying to get  onto the property ladder,  had
acted  irrationality  and  were  suffering  the  consequences.  The  problem  with  this
perspective is that it obscures the extent to which the property bubble was a direct
result  of  government housing policy,  which as McCabe (2011) has demonstrated,
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very often served as a system of state subsidisation for the property and banking
sectors.
‘Inefficient’ Public Sector Workers
There  is  a  common  theme  running  through  the  government  justifications  of
post-boom cuts:  once a target  is  identified,  members of  the government convince
themselves, and seek to convince others, that this particular group is benefiting at
the  expense  of  the  entire  country.  As  with  past  crises,  Ireland’s  economic  crash
represented and continues to represent an opportunity to attack unions, to divide
workers  and to  undermine their  pay and conditions.  In  this  respect  it  was quite
predictable that the government and mainstream media would attempt to create the
impression that Ireland has become uncompetitive internationally, and that wages
would have to be reduced (Kelly 2012).  Because public sector workers are largely
unionised they are usually more inclined to defend their pay and conditions than
workers in the private sector. The gains realised through collective bargaining on the
part of public sector workers represent a benchmark for private sector workers. As
such the former represent a ready-made target, to be isolated from other workers
wherever the opportunity presents itself, and then disciplined as necessary.  
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In 2009 the Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes
was established by Finance Minister Brian Lenihan. The group was set up with the
view  to examining the expenditure programmes in each Government Department
(Department  of  Finance  2013).  Headed  by  UCD  economist  Colm  McCarthy,  it
recommended cuts in public expenditure, which involved reducing the number of
people working in the public sector by 17500. The report was used to rationalise cuts,
but was only a small part in the overall process. Accordingly, it is worth examining
how attacks on the public sector have been sold to the public in general. 
Measures that impact negatively on a society are generally coupled with a discourse
that serves to stigmatise those directly affected, a function ably performed by the
print  media.  In examining representations of  the public service in Ireland’s print
media we see clear evidence of the use of the ‘conflict’ and ‘responsibility’ frames.
Using  a  frame  analysis  approach,  Murphy  (2010)  critically  examines  the
representation of public service workers in the Irish Independent newspaper in the
period that preceded the December 2009 budget. His research clearly documents a
representation  that  was  ‘symbiotic  and  reflective  of  the  dominant  discourse  of
government, business and employer elites that sought to shift the burden created by
the casino capitalism of the free market onto ordinary workers’ (Murphy 2010: 3).
This process entailed efforts to alienate or ‘Other’ this particular group in the minds
of  the  general  public,  through  representations  which  consistently  portrayed  an
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‘unpatriotic,  privileged,  inefficient,  militant,  self-serving  public  sector  worker  in
contrast  with  a  taxpaying,  pension  paying,  efficient,  long-suffering  private  sector
worker’ (p. 10). Week after week a ‘public versus private’ dichotomy was maintained.
The effect of this language (if  not the direct intention) was to create an image of
public sector workers as a burden - a group of people existing at the expense of
private sector workers and the population as a whole. The research also documents a
process of ‘drip feeding future policy decisions in attempts to gauge public reaction’,
and ‘reduce the “shock and awe” effect’ when unpopular and ideological policies are
about to be implemented (p. 18). 
Similarly, Marron (2011) documents how the Irish Health Service Executive and its
employees have been constructed, with sensationalist headlines and inflammatory
content depicting them as inefficient, incompetent, over-paid and privileged. In this
context it  should be noted that the Irish print  media is merely one element of a
system-wide campaign, which we argue aims to transfer culpability for deteriorating
economic  and  social  conditions  to  the  putatively  inefficient  and  parasitic  public
sector – an incredible inversion of reality, we would argue, given the parasitic nature
of finance capital. Sociologists such as Walby (2013) would no doubt underscore the
important gendered processes and inequities at play here since public sector jobs and
services are disproportionately held and supported by women. 
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Welfare Recipients: From Single Mothers to the Biggest ‘Welfare Queen’ of All 
In post ‘Celtic Tiger’ Ireland, the government has chosen to make direct and indirect
cuts to social welfare. The increased cost of the social welfare budget is attributable to
structural deficits in the Irish labour market (which was dominated by construction
during the boom) and which has seen consistently high levels of unemployment after
the 2008 crash.  However,  rather  than conceding any failure on their  own part  to
develop the productive economy and boost employment, politicians in association
with  a  complicit  media  repeatedly  sensationalize  ‘social  welfare  fraud’  -  a
construction that ostensibly justifies ongoing welfare cuts. Various entitlements have
been targeted,  entitlements  which  typically  make life  more bearable for  low and
middle  income  groups  and  which  disproportionately  include  women  who  are
hardest hit in times of economic crisis (Walby 2013). 
The people of Ireland are routinely exposed to television investigations by leading
state  and  commercial  stations,  print  media  coverage,  and  vocal  pronouncements
from  politicians  in  the  main  parties  claiming  that  massive  fraud  is  occurring.
Ireland’s commercial TV3 station has been quite enthusiastic about this. In 2011, 2012
and 2013  the  station  aired a  documentary  on ‘dole  cheats’  from the  series  ‘Paul
Connolly Investigates’. The TV3 website description of the documentary reads: ‘Paul
takes a look at the rampant problem of social welfare fraud occurring in Ireland’
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(TV3 Player 2013). Conveniently, each time this was aired it helped the government
to rationalize ever deeper cuts to welfare. Claims of fraud are of course only part of
the strategy. All manner of rationalisations were offered for the regressive measures
contained in the Social Welfare Bill of December 2012, not least with respect to the
putative immorality and/or imprudence of claimants. 
Such judgements were offered most enthusiastically by Fine Gael TD Derek Keating
who decided to highlight single mothers who were framed as promiscuous, unwise
in  their  choice  of  partners  and  abusing  the  system.  With  righteous  indignation,
Keating complained of ‘young women who find themselves caring, not for one child
or two, but for three and four children by multiple fathers who are uncaring and
failing in their duties of care and support with the consequences picked up by the
taxpayer’ (cited in Browne 2012). These young women were apparently creating ‘a
new lifestyle of welfare economy’ (ibid.). This sudden concern about single-parents’
claims on welfare could not have been prompted by any increase in occurrence, since
the number of single-parent claimants had dropped from 92,326 in 2010 to 87,735 in
2012 (ibid.). In any case, as Browne elaborates: ‘60% (of claimants) have only one
child, 28% have two children and the remaining circa 12% come in the category of
having three or more children — with many of these families comprising women
who  are  divorced  or  separated  after  their  marriages  broke  down’.  The  strategy
employed by Keating has a long history and is similarly witnessed in Britain (see
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Skeggs 2006, Tyler 2008, 2013). In fact it can be traced at least as far back as Thomas
Malthus’ opposition to the Old Poor Law (abolished in 1834), which depended on
claims that the system was facilitating immorality, dependency, irresponsibility and
feckless breeding (self-reference 2009).
When it comes to efforts to scapegoat vulnerable groups, those involved typically
prefer  anecdotes  over  facts. For  example,  in  2008  Labour  Party  spokesperson on
Social and Family Affairs, Roisin Shortall, said there was a need for greater vigilance
against child benefit fraud by migrants, and called on the state to stop such payments
abroad  (self  reference  2010).  This  was  a  staggering  request  given  that  the
arrangement  was  provided  for  under  EU  law  (O’Brien  2009).  Likewise,  in 2009
Limerick County Councillor, Liam Galvin (Fine Gael) said that he believed that a
considerable amount of fraud was being committed through the wrongful claiming
of ‘welfare benefits’ by foreign nationals. He stated that ‘taxi drivers are picking up
foreigners at the airport and driving them straight to the welfare office and straight
back to the airport again’ (Limerick Leader 26th May cited in self-reference et al 2012:
13-14).ii Yet, Councillor Galvin’s assertions seem to ignore the fact that since 2004 all
applicants had to satisfy the Habitual Residence Condition (HRC) for a wide range of
social welfare payments (Department of Social Protection 2010a, 2010b).
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Another common approach in order to enhance frame resonance is to highlight an
extreme  example  of  welfare  abuse  that  people  can  easily  visualise,  and  then
extrapolate from the individual case to claims of welfare fraud on an industrial scale.
This approach was taken in 2011 as the government were planning to  cut  social
welfare. Minister of State Fergus O’Dowd claimed that there was widespread fraud
in the social welfare system, costing the state somewhere in the region of €600m (Taft
2011). Though the newspapers, state broadcasters and others uncritically repeated
these assertions, the  €600 million figure of welfare fraud was in reality a ‘control
saving’. This means that ‘if there were no controls or inspections’, there would be a
guesstimated ‘€600 million in over-payments over time, but crucially fraud would
only account for a minority of these over-payments’ (Taft 2011a). As Taft elaborates,
fraud was actually accounted for at a rate of ‘€21 million in 2007, rising to €26 million
by  2010’,  figures  which  are  approximately  0.1%  of  the  Department  of  Social
Protections’  budget.  However  publicizing  these  figures  would  not  fit  with  the
hegemonic  anti-welfare  agenda  qua  ‘responsibility’  frame;  thus,  we  concur  with
Taft’s  assertion  that  ‘to  talk  of  €600  million  in  fraud  is  highly  fraudulent’.  Yet,
crucially, the  extent to which these discourses have taken hold within the general
public  -  the  degree  to  which  they  resonate  with  pre-existing  prejudices  and
dominant ideology - has meant that cuts to welfare tend not to appear as attacks on
the most vulnerable.  Rather,  they are framed as a means of tackling the putative
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abuse  of  the  system  and the  irresponsibility  of  feckless  groups  that  cannot  and
should not be tolerated in a time of crisis (also, self reference 2013).
As we have been careful to establish, it is not only the poor and vulnerable who have
been targeted in the media. Because the FIRE sector is the largest recipient of state
handouts  –  it  is  the biggest  ‘welfare  queen’,  so  to  speak,  following a  historically
unprecedented bailout – ‘banker bashing’ is also commonplace. However, we would
argue  such  a  practice  also  serves  to  deflect  attention  from the  predation  of  the
financial sector, which, after all, does not create wealth, but merely extracts it from
where it is originally created for itself (Ticktin 2009). So-called banker bashing is a
means of disseminating the enabling myth of a few rotten worms in an otherwise
healthy green apple (Žižek 2009), irrespective of the fact that rotten worms are not
required for a socially destructive speculative frenzy to develop. The tendency to
individualise  is  ever-present.  Many commentators  in  Ireland,  such as  McNamara
(2013) trace the nation’s woes back to decisions taken in Europe, pointing the finger
of blame at ‘criminally incompetent’ EU leaders. This, we would argue, is to deflect
attention away from European finance, members of which would hardly consider
decisions that benefit the FIRE sector as incompetent.  To suggest that EU leaders
failed  to  properly  oversee  matters  presumes  too  much.  We  would  be  in  broad
agreement with Storey (2013), who claims that accusations of incompetence are far
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too charitable since ‘what has happened is largely in line with how the makers of the
Eurozone saw the system working’.
In the end, the process of scapegoating described above serves a dual-purpose: on
the  one  hand it  deflects  blame from the  government  and the  interests  that  it  is
prioritising; on the other hand it serves to rationalise and normalise attacks on those
that  it  has  decided  must  bear  the  costs.  The  process  is  part  of  the  generalised
‘transference of evil’ and, indeed, the transference of privately accumulated debt as
part of a moralised as well as economic class project that is inseparable from other
intersecting axes of power (notably gender and ethnicity). It is not surprising that the
mainstream media,  which  have  long  acted  as  cheerleaders  for  the  property  and
financial  sectors,  began  to  point  the  finger  at  myriad  targets  post  2008  as  the
consequences of the system they championed descended into chaos, producing all
manner  of  societal  discontents.  With  respect  to  the  damage  inflicted  upon  Irish
society,  the  government  and  mainstream  media  have  overwhelmingly  sought  to
justify austerity – something that we consider unjustifiable despite the resonance of
their neoliberal frames among ‘right minded’ (conservative thinking) denizens. The
more obvious the damage wrought by the financial firms, property developers and
speculators, and the more obvious the source of deteriorating conditions, the greater
the attempts  to  transfer  blame to  those  lower down the social  structure  wherein
inequalities and inequity are most acutely experienced. 
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Conclusion
Scapegoating  is  a  multi-faceted and embedded social  process  that  is  inseparable
from and is  indeed exacerbated by deteriorating material  conditions of existence.
Drawing  in  particular  from  group  conflict  theory,  frame  analysis  and  Marxian
informed critique of the current economic crisis, our paper aimed to make sense of
what  is  in  many  respects  utterly  senseless  and  unnecessary  for  those  who  dare
imagine a more just and equal society. For Allen (2009: 113), post crash Ireland is
defined as a ‘mad, mad world’ where all manner of inequities are institutionalised
and myths prevail. However, this is also a world that is socially structured according
to discernible interests and the distribution of power within and between nations.  
One key  conclusion is  that  the  process  of  scapegoating cannot  be understood in
isolation from the socially destructive character of global finance capital, or from the
power-relations  ensuring  that  particular  interests  are  preserved  in  the  event  of
economic collapse. In Ireland, the process has to be set against the knowledge that
the FIRE sector’s interests have been prioritised above all other considerations (such
as gender justice), representing perhaps in exaggerated form how the power of the
nation state underpins the monetary system itself. Between 2007/8 and 2011, €20bn
(12 percent of GDP) was taken out of the Irish economy in austerity budgets. Though
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the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council has claimed austerity is working by reducing the
nation’s deficit, Taft (2011b) clearly demonstrates that it has not worked. Austerity
has achieved no more than a 1.8 per cent reduction in the deficit, but has contributed
to  the  sharp  increase  in  poverty,  the  return  to  mass  unemployment  and  mass
emigration.  It  is  of  course difficult  to  rationalise policies  that  have such negative
effects, particularly since the reckless, destructive and parasitic character of the FIRE
sector  has  been  so  fully  exposed.  Yet,  such  narrow interests  are  still  prioritised,
which means offloading the costs of its speculative activity onto the larger public.
Because  there  are  incredible  social  costs  to  this,  heavy  symbolic  machinery  and
capital continue to be deployed to deflect blame away from the powerful FIRE sector
– an unfortunate yet sociologically interesting twist on group conflict theory that has
hitherto largely focused on the degradation of small minority groups rather than
larger populations (including entire odiously indebted nations). As such, it is clear to
us  that  the  rationalisation  of  government  policy  in  Ireland  and  the  process  of
scapegoating are really two sides of the same coin. The key consideration here is that
of  class power as it  operates within and between nations in an integrated world
system. Through both the boom and the crisis periods, Irish government policy has
largely transferred wealth upwards and outwards (e.g. via payments to international
bondholders and corporate tax avoidance) and debt downwards and inwards (e.g. as
increased  mortgage  burdens  or  socialised  banking  debt  that  was  placed  on  the
sovereign balance sheet). Just as elected politicians have dispensed with democracy
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and  continue  to  serve  the  interests  of  a  feral  overclass  at  public  expense,  the
mainstream media  has  also  largely  been  subservient  and  complicit  by  accepting
government rationalisations of ‘austerity’ measures and limiting the political debate
to what cuts should be made in the ‘national interest’ (sic). In order to preserve the
accumulated  claims  on  wealth  on  the  part  of  bankers,  property  speculators  and
bondholders, more and more cuts and taxes are imposed on the general population,
the  justification  of  which  invariably  involves  deflecting  blame  away  from  the
beneficiaries  of  austerity,  and  towards  its  victims. We  would  stress  the  point,
however,  that  it  is  not  only  Ireland’s  (new)  poor  and  marginalised  who  risk
vilification. Ireland simply offers a lens with which to highlight the pervasive process
of scapegoating and its role in the economic crisis as it affects populations across the
world. Ireland serves as a cautionary tale - an example of the power and dominance
of the financial sector under late capitalism, and of the ideological means by which
its oppressive ends are currently facilitated.  
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i In that regard, patterns of corporate take-over appear to be writ large at the sovereign level and
this does not bode well for Ireland’s future. We would be remiss here if we did not mention there is
a historical record of workers’ savings, via ‘pension-fund’ or ‘money manager capitalism’, being
appropriated and used to attack labour and industrial capital through corporate looting and asset
stripping (Hudson 2010: 439).
ii See  self  reference  at  al.  (2010)  for  a  fuller  discussion  on  how  Irish  politicians  constructed
Transnational EU migrants in Ireland between 2008 and 2010. 
